Security Overview

While the Bare Metal service is intended to be a secure application,
it is important to understand what it does and does not cover today.

Deployers must properly evaluate their use case and take the
appropriate actions to secure their environment(s). This document is
intended to provide an overview of what risks an operator of the Bare
Metal service should be aware of. It is not intended as a How-To guide
for securing a data center or an OpenStack deployment.

REST API: user roles
and policy settings

Beginning with the Newton (6.1.0) release, the Bare Metal service
allows operators significant control over API access:

• Access may be restricted to each method (GET, PUT, etc) for each
  REST resource. Defaults are provided with the release and defined in
  code.
• Access may be divided between an “administrative” role with full
  access and “observer” role with read-only access. By default, these
  roles are assigned the names baremetal_admin and
  baremetal_observer, respectively.
• By default, passwords and instance secrets are hidden in
  driver_info and instance_info, respectively.
  In case of debugging or diagnosing, the behavior can be overridden by
  changing the policy file. To allow password in driver_info
  unmasked for users with administrative privileges, apply following
  changes to policy configuration file:

  "show_password": "rule:is_admin"

  And restart the Bare Metal API service to take effect. Please check
  /configuration/policy
  for more details.

Prior to the Newton (6.1.0) release, the Bare Metal service only
supported two policy options:

• API access may be secured by a simple policy rule: users with
  administrative privileges may access all API resources, whereas users
  without administrative privileges may only access public API
  resources.
• Passwords contained in the driver_info field may be
  hidden from all API responses with the show_password policy
  setting. This defaults to always hide passwords, regardless of the
  user’s role. You can override it with policy configuration as described
  above.

Multi-tenancy

There are two aspects of multitenancy to consider when evaluating a
deployment of the Bare Metal Service: interactions between tenants on
the network, and actions one tenant can take on a machine that will
affect the next tenant.

Network Interactions

Interactions between tenants’ workloads running simultaneously on
separate servers include, but are not limited to: IP spoofing, packet
sniffing, and network man-in-the-middle attacks.

By default, the Bare Metal service provisions all nodes on a “flat”
network, and does not take any precautions to avoid or prevent
interaction between tenants. This can be addressed by integration with
the OpenStack Identity, Compute, and Networking services, so as to
provide tenant-network isolation.

Lingering Effects

Interactions between tenants placed sequentially on the same server
include, but are not limited to: changes in BIOS settings, modifications
to firmware, or files left on disk or peripheral storage devices (if
these devices are not erased between uses).

By default, the Bare Metal service will erase (clean) the local disk
drives during the “cleaning” phase, after deleting an instance. It
does not reset BIOS or reflash firmware or peripheral devices.
This can be addressed through customizing the utility ramdisk used
during the “cleaning” phase. See details in the Firmware security section.

Firmware security

When the Bare Metal service deploys an operating system image to a
server, that image is run natively on the server without virtualization.
Any user with administrative access to the deployed instance has
administrative access to the underlying hardware.

Most servers’ default settings do not prevent a privileged local user
from gaining direct access to hardware devices. Such a user could modify
device or firmware settings, and potentially flash new firmware to the
device, before deleting their instance and allowing the server to be
allocated to another user.

If the [conductor]/automated_clean configuration option
is enabled (and the [deploy]/erase_devices_priority
configuration option is not zero), the Bare Metal service will securely
erase all local disk devices within a machine during instance deletion.
However, the service does not ship with any code that will validate the
integrity of, or make any modifications to, system or device firmware or
firmware settings.

Operators are encouraged to write their own hardware manager plugins
for the ironic-python-agent ramdisk. This should include
custom clean steps that would be run during the cleaning process, as part of
Node de-provisioning. The clean steps would perform the
specific actions necessary within that environment to ensure the
integrity of each server’s firmware.

Ideally, an operator would work with their hardware vendor to ensure
that proper firmware security measures are put in place ahead of time.
This could include:

• installing signed firmware for BIOS and peripheral devices
• using a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) to validate signatures at boot
  time
• booting machines in UEFI secure
  boot mode, rather than BIOS mode, to validate kernel signatures
• disabling local (in-band) access from the host OS to the management
  controller (BMC)
• disabling modifications to boot settings from the host OS

Additional references:

• cleaning

UEFI secure boot mode

Some hardware types support turning UEFI
secure boot dynamically when deploying an instance. Currently these
are /admin/drivers/ilo,
/admin/drivers/irmc and
/admin/drivers/redfish.

Support for the UEFI secure boot is declared by adding the
secure_boot capability in the capabilities
parameter in the properties field of a node.
secure_boot is a boolean parameter and takes value as
true or false.

To enable secure_boot on a node add it to
capabilities:

baremetal node set <node> --property capabilities='secure_boot:true'

Alternatively use /admin/inspection to automatically populate the secure
boot capability.

Compatible images

Use element ubuntu-signed or fedora to
build signed deploy ISO and user images with diskimage-builder.

The below command creates files named cloud-image-boot.iso,
cloud-image.initrd, cloud-image.vmlinuz and cloud-image.qcow2 in the
current working directory:

cd <path-to-diskimage-builder>
./bin/disk-image-create -o cloud-image ubuntu-signed baremetal iso

Ensure the public key of the signed image is loaded into bare metal
to deploy signed images.

Enabling with OpenStack
Compute

Nodes having secure_boot set to true may be
requested by adding an extra_spec to the nova flavor:

openstack flavor set <flavor> --property capabilities:secure_boot="true"
openstack server create --flavor <flavor> --image <image> instance-1

If capabilities is used in extra_spec as
above, nova scheduler (ComputeCapabilitiesFilter) will
match only ironic nodes which have the secure_boot set
appropriately in properties/capabilities. It will filter
out rest of the nodes.

The above facility for matching in nova can be used in heterogeneous
environments where there is a mix of machines supporting and not
supporting UEFI secure boot, and operator wants to provide a choice to
the user regarding secure boot. If the flavor doesn’t contain
secure_boot then nova scheduler will not consider secure
boot mode as a placement criteria, hence user may get a secure boot
capable machine that matches with user specified flavors but deployment
would not use its secure boot capability. Secure boot deploy would
happen only when it is explicitly specified through flavor.

Enabling standalone

To request secure boot for an instance in standalone mode (without
OpenStack Compute), you need to add the capability directly to the
node’s instance_info:

baremetal node set <node> --instance-info capabilities='{"secure_boot": "true"}'

Other considerations

Internal networks

Access to networks which the Bare Metal service uses internally
should be prohibited from outside. These networks are the ones used for
management (with the nodes’ BMC controllers), provisioning, cleaning (if
used) and rescuing (if used).

This can be done with physical or logical network isolation, traffic
filtering, etc.

Management interface
technologies

Some nodes support more than one management interface technology
(vendor and IPMI for example). If you use only one modern technology for
out-of-band node access, it is recommended that you disable IPMI since
the IPMI protocol is not secure. If IPMI is enabled, in most cases a
local OS administrator is able to work in-band with IPMI settings
without specifying any credentials, as this is a DCMI specification
requirement.

Tenant network isolation

If you use tenant network isolation, services (TFTP or HTTP) that
handle the nodes’ boot files should serve requests only from the
internal networks that are used for the nodes being deployed and
cleaned.

TFTP protocol does not support per-user access control at all.

For HTTP, there is no generic and safe way to transfer credentials to
the node.

Also, tenant network isolation is not intended to work with
network-booting a node by default, once the node has been
provisioned.

API endpoints for RAM disk
use

There are two
(unauthorized) endpoints in the Bare Metal API that are intended for
use by the ironic-python-agent RAM disk. They are not intended for
public use.

These endpoints can potentially cause security issues. Access to
these endpoints from external or untrusted networks should be
prohibited. An easy way to do this is to:

• set up two groups of API services: one for external requests, the
  second for deploy RAM disks’ requests.
• to disable unauthorized access to these endpoints in the (first)
  API services group that serves external requests, the following lines
  should be added to the policy.yaml file <configuration/sample-policy.html>:

  # Send heartbeats from IPA ramdisk
  "baremetal:node:ipa_heartbeat": "rule:is_admin"
  
  # Access IPA ramdisk functions
  "baremetal:driver:ipa_lookup": "rule:is_admin"